X6 — Assurance horizons and erosion clocks — the PVM reading
The decision doc's assurance horizon (§5.9) is structurally the Privacy Value Model's erosion clock: a
proof's privacy guarantee is fixed at proof time, but the observer's background accumulates — the proof
does not leak more; it matters less.
Register: none — X-series research bridge (agentprivacy research reaching into TF work, not a
register expansion) · leverage 🟡 · Ladder: reference built 2026-07-18 —
Lab — erosion-record 8/8: ten-clock sort as a closed validated list,
erosion-aware residual-risk record (overclaimed measurement structurally banned; rate-not-cliff
enforced), PR-UNQ worked example with §23-routed re-base accountability. See its NOTES.md
Anchor (decision doc): §5.9 assurance horizon · §5.10 cryptoperiod · §22.1 separate clocks · §10.6
reliance expiry · §2.4 "for how long" · §19/§20 disclosure surfaces and observable events · §26
residual-risk record.
Anchor (PVM): PVM V6 moving ceiling, C82 (WP-07 Def 3.9 + Cor 5.4b lineage): erosion form
R_inf(t) = Σε_i / H(X | B_t); two-clock thesis (certification clock vs erosion clock).
What the decision doc offers
The decision doc already treats time as first-class. §2.4 makes "for how long" a mandatory parameter
of every material claim — "a claim missing one of these parameters is not merely incomplete
documentation. It is not yet a testable claim." §5.9 defines the assurance horizon as the period over
which claims "remain supportable, taking account of cryptographic assumptions, biometric threat
evolution, schema stability, governance validity, status freshness, retention, and operational controls."
§22.1 lists ten distinct clocks a profile MUST distinguish; §10.6 makes reliance expire at the
earliest of a mixed list; §19/§20 enumerate the accumulating observables — schema fields, status and
registry queries, presentation timing, retries, cross-proof composition — while ruling that "the
specification claims unlinkability, not undetectability."
What it does not yet offer is a theory of why some of those clocks behave differently from others.
What the PVM offers
The PVM V6 moving-ceiling result (C82, proven-conditional, WP-07 Cor 5.4b lineage) is exactly that
theory. A ZK guarantee is compute-saturated: the per-show leakage ε_i is fixed at proof time and the
transcript never leaks more later. What moves is the denominator — the adversary's background
information B_t (linkage corpora, side priors, accumulated observables) grows on a calendar, so the
effective anonymity mass H(X | B_t) shrinks and the erosion ratio R_inf(t) = Σε_i / H(X | B_t) rises.
The protection does not leak more; it matters less. The drift is informational, not computational.
V6 names two clock families: the certification clock (an authority certifies a value and can
re-certify it) and the erosion clock (background accumulation nobody can renew — only re-base).
The claim
- §5.9 is an erosion clock. The assurance horizon is not another expiry an authority sets; it is
the composite envelope of quantities that degrade as observables accumulate over the §19/§20
surfaces. Verifier-side and observer-side B_t grows with every schema field revealed, every status
query, every timing pattern, every cross-show composition — exactly the correlators §10.4 and §18.4
already list. - "For how long" should be stated as a rate, not a cliff. A disclosure boundary (§5.4) needs an
erosion analysis, not just an expiry date: how fast does the claim degrade as the named observables
accumulate, and what accumulation level triggers re-base. The §10.6 earliest-of list stays — cliffs
are still real for certification clocks — but the erosion-family entries get a rate statement. - The ten clocks sort into the two families, and the sort sharpens §22 conformance: certification
clocks need renewal mechanisms; erosion clocks need monitoring plus re-base triggers (§22.3
migration, re-enrolment). §22.2's ban on "permanent or unbounded" defaults is, in this reading, the
requirement that no erosion clock be left unwatched.
The ten clocks of §22.1, sorted
| §22.1 clock | Family | Who moves it | Renewal / re-base path |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proof-transcript lifetime | certification | profile | expires per transcript (§15) |
| Challenge/session lifetime | certification | verifier policy | new session |
| Attestation validity | certification | issuer | re-issuance |
| Status freshness | certification | status authority | refresh / snapshot (§12.4) |
| Nullifier epoch | certification | context authority (§6.7) | governed rollover (§5.8) |
| Enrolment-root cryptoperiod | certification | issuer/governance (§5.10) | rotation, migration (§22.3) |
| Policy & accreditation validity | certification | governance authority | re-accreditation |
| Log retention | erosion | retained observables accrue into B_t | deletion/segregation; §20 minimisation slows the rate |
| Proof-system security horizon | erosion (see honesty note) | cryptanalytic background accumulates | re-base by migration (§22.3) |
| Biometric assurance horizon | erosion | "biometric threat evolution" (§5.9) | re-base by re-enrolment under stronger policy |
The §5.9 assurance horizon is then the minimum over the erosion rows — the envelope clock. Honesty
note: the proof-system security horizon is erosion-family operationally (nobody renews it; only
migration re-bases it), but its driver is computational advance, whereas the PVM's R(t) drift is
strictly informational; the bridge is structural, not an identity.
What exists
- The decision doc's complete time machinery (§2.4, §5.8–§5.10, §10.6, §22) — the TF side of the bridge.
- PVM V6: C82 proven-conditional with the erosion form and shelf life t* = sup{t : R(t) < 1}; C97
(non-reconstruction as the ownability mechanism, "durable for the term the erosion clock permits"). - Appendix B's
for_how_longblock — the natural place a rate statement would slot beside the existingassurance_horizon: 2 yearscliff value.
Build plan
- B1 — sort note. The table above, expanded one paragraph per row, with the §19/§20 observable list
cross-referenced as the B_t inputs per disclosure boundary. (This doc is B1's draft.) - B2 — erosion-aware residual-risk record. A YAML extension of §26's residual-risk record: per
disclosure boundary, the accumulating observables, an estimated erosion horizon, the monitoring
signal, and the re-base trigger. Mirror Appendix B's shape. - B3 — worked example on PR-UNQ. The nullifier's within-context pseudonym (§13.5) is the cleanest
accumulating observable: state its erosion analysis alongside the existing epoch/cryptoperiod cliffs.
Upstream surface
Careful — this is agentprivacy research reaching into TF work. The candidate surface is an informative
research note (an annex or appendix note beside §22 / §26), cited as external research (PVM V6 /
WP-07 Cor 5.4b lineage), offered through TF discussion — never normative text, and never a dependency of
any profile. The narrow language stays the decision doc's own; the note contributes the two-family sort
and the rate-not-cliff framing, nothing else.
Open questions
- H(X | B_t) is mostly not measurable in deployment. What proxy observables (registry-query volume,
presentation frequency, schema-variant rarity) are honest enough to drive a monitoring signal without
overclaiming a quantity? - Does log retention belong wholly to the erosion family, or is it a certification-set parameter
(retention period) whose effect (correlation accumulation) is the erosion quantity? The record
format may need both faces. - Should the §26 residual-risk record require an erosion section, or offer it as an optional class? A
MUST is premature before the TF has seen a worked example (B3). - Where does re-base authority sit? Erosion clocks have no renewing authority by definition — but the
migration/re-enrolment trigger still needs an accountable party in the §23 matrix.