guide to agentprivacy
Browse collections
✨Visualise
Connect with Star
Your VTA, your chosen perspective

The planned connection uses your VTA and the Trust Spanning Protocol to carry a scoped exchange for you or your agent. You choose what is presented; the receiving service checks the request before a view is shared.

This guide has no VTA connection adapter yet. Opening Star does not connect an identity or send a key.

Open Star ↗ · Inspect your City Key ↗
guide / DTG / O5 O6 O8 — Supporting Notes

O5 · O6 · O8 — Supporting explorations

Three lower-cost lines: the freshness/transcript conformance harness, the pools cross-pollination, and the
post-quantum path. Each is mostly reuse of what already exists.

Register: O5, O6, O8 · leverage 🟡 · Ladder: design notes


O5 — Runtime 05 as the transcript-conformance harness

Anchor: cred-spec taskContext + outcome-interpretability · decision doc PR-FRE (§15).

The decision doc upgraded this exploration's target. The original idea bound the freshness nonce to
witnessContext.sessionId; §15.2 now rules that a bare nonce is insufficient — freshness means binding
to a canonical transcript: protocol/profile versions, verifier/audience, governed context descriptor,
purpose, scope, challenge, session, requested predicates, policy requirements, delegation reference, expiry,
snapshot requirements, proving mode, encoding version.

So runtime 05 becomes the conformance harness for PR-FRE:

  • implement canonical-transcript formation + digest (one implementation, shared with the VWC seat's
    transcript_digest and O7's step-up binding);
  • property tests from §26.1's negative list: replay into another verifier/context/purpose/scope/transcript
    must fail; a materially different transcript with the same nonce must fail; transcript-field observation
    is recorded as disclosure (§15.4), not treated as free.

Cheapest full deliverable in the lab: PR-FRE is required by both MLP and EPP, so the harness serves every
profile. Negative meaning carried: PR-FRE establishes only binding-to-current-transcript — never
liveness, personhood, identity, or authority (§15.3).

O6 — Correlation architecture ↔ privacy-pools / mana-pools lineage

Anchor: cred-spec four-DID model (R/M/C/P) with mandatory R-DID uniqueness · decision doc §6
(context = governed linkability domain) · §6.6 prohibited cross-context linkage.

The pools lineage (privacy-pools withdraw folding, mana-pools, the runtime-01 nullifier itself) is the same
unlinkability discipline the spec's correlation architecture demands. Two directions of transfer:

  • Pools → DTG: domain-separated derivation as the R/M/C/P-DID minting discipline — each R-DID is a
    per-counterparty derivation from the holder secret, exactly the pools' per-context pseudonym pattern;
    the pools' association-set reasoning maps to registry epoch roots (O4).
  • DTG → pools: the decision doc's context machinery (§6.2 canonical descriptors, §6.7 context
    authority + change control, §6.6 prohibited-linkage list) is a governance layer the pools story never
    formalized — "which withdrawals may be linked, by whom, under whose authority" is a context decision
    record. The 0xbow/ASP world would recognize every row of it.

Deliverable: a two-page derivation-discipline note (how one holder secret safely mints R/M/C/P-DIDs with
provable non-correlation, pools-style) — feeds O2's descriptor upgrade and any TF question about DID
derivation. Low urgency; write when O2's M2 lands.

O8 — The post-quantum path

Anchor: strawman §8 ("pre-quantum acceptable for v1, documented PQ path") · decision doc §24 ("MUST NOT
make post-quantum support a blocker for the first implementable release") + §29 (PQ migration = an
implementation question "requiring layer separability and evidence, not only algorithm identifiers") +
§22.3 (migration must be a concrete mechanism).

The TF can lead the PQ story for the whole DTG stack precisely because the decision doc keeps it out of
V1's critical path. The deliverable is a layer-separability analysis, not a scheme swap:

Layer PQ status
Hash commitments, nullifiers, Merkle roots (the shared gadget) already PQ-safe (symmetric/hash assumptions)
Proof system (Groth16/PLONK-class over pairings) not PQ; the layer that must be swappable (STARK-class successors)
Issuer signatures on attestations (IDVC, VWC, delegation) migrate with issuer PKI (ML-DSA et al.) — an O3 schema-versioning concern, not a circuit concern
Long-lived artefacts (enrolment roots, §22.2 cryptoperiods) the real exposure: harvest-now-decrypt-later applies to anything retained; cryptoperiods are the control

Threat-model credibility comes from the ecdsa.fail / quantum-ECC lineage (shor_mage): concrete cost models
for the classical-breaks timeline rather than hand-waving. Deliverable: a "PQ considerations" section for
the V1 draft doing §22.3 properly — profile identifiers, version negotiation, overlap periods, downgrade
protection, and what happens to enrolment roots at migration. Write once the construction gate (§25) has
named actual proof systems; before that it has nothing concrete to separate.